Coastal flooding and frontline health care services: challenges for flood risk resilience in the English health care system. by Landeg, Owen et al.
LSHTM Research Online
Landeg, Owen; Whitman, Geoff; Walker-Springett, Kate; Butler, Catherine; Bone, Angie; Kovats,
Sari; (2019) Coastal flooding and frontline health care services: challenges for flood risk resilience
in the English health care system. Journal of health services research & policy. 1355819619840672-.
ISSN 1355-8196 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1355819619840672
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4654252/
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1355819619840672
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: Creative Commons Attribution Non-commercial
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk
Original Research
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health care system
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Abstract
Objectives: Our objective was to assess the health care system impacts associated with the December 2013 east coast
flooding in Boston, Lincolnshire, in order to gain an insight into the capacity of the health care sector to respond to high-
impact weather.
Methods: Semistructured interviews were held with regional strategic decision makers and local service managers
within 1 km of the recorded flood outline to ascertain their experiences, views and reflections concerning the event and
its associated health impacts and disruption to health care services. A snowballing sampling technique was used to
ensure the study had participants across a broad range of expertise. Interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim,
and data analysis was preformed using NVivo (v10) to apply a thematic coding and develop a framework of ideas.
Results: The results of this case study provide a vital insight into the health care disruption caused by flooding. All
sectors of the health care system suffered disruption, which placed a strain on the whole system and reduced the
capacity of the sector to respond to the health consequences of flooding and delivering routine health care. The formal
recovery phase in Lincolnshire was stood-down on 4th February 2014. The results of this work indicate limitations in
preparedness of the health care system for the reasonable worse-case scenario for an east coast surge event.
Conclusions: The health care sector appears to have limited capacity to respond to weather-related impacts and is
therefore unprepared for the risks associated with a future changing climate. Further work is required to ensure that the
health care system continues to review and learn from such events to increase climate resilience.
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Introduction
The resilience of health care systems is an emerging
topic of international importance, reflecting concerns
about the wide-ranging consequences for human
health from climate change.1,2 Health care systems
themselves need to be resilient to climatic events to
ensure that there is sufficient capacity to address the
impacts of climate change on human health.2–6 The
World Health Organization’s working definition of a
climate resilient health system is one ‘that is capable to
anticipate, respond to, cope with, recover from and
adapt to climate related shocks and stress, so as to
bring sustained improvements in population health,
despite an unstable climate.’7
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Storms and floods are known to reduce the ability of
health care systems to respond to health crises, affect-
ing the quality of health care provision.8–10 Despite
recognition of the vulnerability, there is a lack of
research into how climate change will impact on
health care systems and what mitigation measures are
available.2,5 More specifically, few studies have
explored in detail the impacts of flooding on health
care systems,10 despite previous flood events having
detrimental effects on health care system infrastructure
across Europe.7,11
Coastal flooding is considered a significant risk to
the United Kingdom’s (UK) national security accord-
ing to the National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies
and has been shown to damage critical national infra-
structure, including health care assets.2,12–15 Given the
country’s investment in health care, the financial risks
are considerable. According to the UK Health
Accounts, published by the Office for National
Statistics, health care expenditure in the UK accounted
for 9.8% of gross domestic product in 2016.
Ascertaining the current level of risk is challenging
due to the dynamic nature of flood risk.
Approximately 14% of ambulance stations (n¼ 111),
12% of fire stations (n¼ 160), 11% of police stations
(n¼ 47) and 6% to 8% of hospitals (n¼ 111), care
homes (n¼ 1044) and surgeries (n¼ 800) in the UK
are located in areas that are susceptible to fluvial and
coastal flooding.16 Assuming a continuation of climate
change, future climate projections for the UK suggest
that flood risk to health care assets is likely to increase.
The proportion of care homes, emergency services, hos-
pitals and doctors’ surgeries at risk of flooding in
England is set to increase by 13%, 11%, 4% and
12%, respectively, by the 2050s under a 2-degree warm-
ing scenario.2,6,17
The 2008 Pitt Review, conducted after the 2007
floods in England, highlighted the vulnerability of the
UK’s health care systems to flooding and concluded
that there were significant failings in the management
and response to flood risks.18 More recently, the
National Adaptation Programme made specific refer-
ence to the need for climate resilience within the health
care system.19 However, research on the impact of cli-
mate change is lacking. We believe this paper is the first
in the UK to seek to address this knowledge gap by
investigating the impact of the 2013–2014 flood events
in Boston, England.
Winter 2013–2014
The winter of 2013–2014 was exceptionally stormy
across the UK and was identified as England’s wettest
winter in 250 years.20 On Thursday, 5th December
2013, a deepening pressure system coincided with
spring tides and strong to gale force north-westerly
winds to generate a coastal surge along the east coast
of England. Coastal water levels exceeded some of
those recorded during the ‘great storm’ of 1953 which
resulted in 307 fatalities and evacuation of 32,000
people21 and which is the basis for the reasonable
worse-case scenario used in emergency planning
assumptions (Table 1).
The December 2013 surge overtopped 18 to 20 km
of flood defences and breached flood defences in four
locations, causing an estimated £8.1m worth of
damage to flood defences and infrastructure. Across
Lincolnshire, several hundred homes were flooded
(the majority in Boston, Trusthorpe and Susworth),
121 businesses were flooded, 44 persons and two pets
were rescued from flood waters and 203 people received
assistance to evacuate.22
Methods
This study aimed to assess the health care system
impacts associated with the December 2013 east coast
storm surge and subsequent flooding in Boston, a port
town in Lincolnshire. Semistructured interviews were
undertaken with personnel involved in preparing for,
responding to and recovering from the December 2013
flooding: regional strategic decision makers (those
within the County Emergency Centre or with respon-
sibility for more than one health asset, for example,
Public Health Consultants) and local service managers
(those with responsibility for one health asset, for
example, family doctor practice managers). A docu-
ment analysis of the published Local Resilience
Forum (LRF) postincident review provided additional
information and confidence in the robustness of
the findings.
Semistructured interviews gave space for the inter-
viewee to influence the focus of the interview and
encouraged a conversational two-way dialogue
between the interviewer and the interviewee.23
Interviews were designed to enable responders to
express their experiences, views and reflections of the
Table 1. Planning assumption for reasonable worse-case sce-
nario (multiple breaches of defences).22
Vulnerable profile Local infrastructure
80,500 properties at risk 6 fire/police/ambulance stations
3 hospitals 176 km of road
29 schools 30 bridges
32 care homes 11.8 km of rail
1 prison 6 major hazard sites
20 fatalities 32 electricity sub-stations
300 casualties 63 water pumping
50,000 evacuees 15 sewage works
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event whilst also providing an insight into the level of
damage and disruption to sites, infrastructure, equip-
ment and services before, during and after 5th
December 2013.
The December 2013 flood outline was ascertained
using the Environment Agency historical flood extent
database. Health care sites and contact details were
obtained from Public Health England (PHE) data-
bases. Geospatial extraction was performed using
ArcMap v10.2. The 32 local service managers within
1 km of the flood extent were invited via post to par-
ticipate in a 30-minute telephone interview (Figure 1).
The 1-km radius enabled the inclusion of health
care facilities and services directly flooded and those
disrupted or otherwise indirectly affected by
the flooding.
Regional strategic decision makers were identified in
collaboration with the East Midlands PHE Centre and
the Public Health Department of Lincolnshire County
Council. A total of 15 participants were invited via
email to participate in a 1-hour telephone or face-
to-face interview, depending upon their availability
and preference. Using telephone interviews also over-
came the constraints of time, resources and geograph-
ical location for researchers and participants.
Interviews were conducted during June and July
2016, using snowball sampling to ensure the study
had participants across a broad range of expertise.
A strategy to determine the appropriateness of the
sample size broadly in line with the concept of satura-
tion was applied,24 with suggested individuals/services
being invited and interviewed until no new themes or
issues emerged. All participants provided written con-
sent prior to participation, and interviews were
recorded and transcribed verbatim for data analysis.
To maintain confidentiality, participants were ascribed
a random participant number. The data were analysed
using NVivo (v10) to apply thematic coding,25 permit-
ting a framework of ideas to be established from the
data. NVivo facilitates management and organization
of data into codes that take the form of analytic themes
arising from the data. Once coded, the resulting data
files were read and reread and treated to several itera-
tions of sense making. This process was primarily data
led, with a focus on emergent concerns, but it was also
informed by the existing literature and key concerns
relevant to policy. The coding framework was created
iteratively, with an initial coding exercise carried out by
the research team using a selection of transcripts to
agree initial themes and ensure consistency.
Results
A total of 18 semistructured interviews were conducted,
7 face-to-face and 11 via telephone; 5 local service
managers across 4 localities and 13 regional strategic
decision makers participated in the study. The response
rate amongst regional strategic decision makers was
86.6%; for local service managers, it was 15.6%.
Participants were drawn from a wide range of frontline
health care services and strategic organizations, includ-
ing National Health Service (NHS) trusts, emergency
services and local government. Two voluntary sector
organizations were included in the study, one offering
palliative and end-of-life care and another providing
people, equipment, space and resources to support
those affected by an emergency (Figure 2).
The analysis revealed the following five major
themes: warning and preparedness, at-risk populations,
evacuation, health care infrastructure and services, and
opportunities for resilience. These themes are discussed
in the following sections.
Warning and preparedness
Levels of preparedness, recognition of the flood risk
and awareness of the potential impacts of the surge
were found to be inconsistent across the health care
system, with a particular divergence between strategic
and frontline organizations. Respondents described
limited preparatory action among local frontline serv-
ices, despite the inclusion of the health care system
within the multiagency coastal flooding Exercise
Lazarus held in November 2013.
A high level of preparedness was reported amongst
regional strategic decision makers: ‘In fact, they [Flood
Forecasting Centre] are so good now at forecasting the
impacts . . .we do take them very seriously’ (strategic
decision maker 008). However, this view was not
echoed by frontline staff who stated ‘[flooding] was
worse than we expected . . . the actual aftermath of
patients wanting to be seen etc., was a lot more chaotic’
(local service manager 030). Some frontline providers
also reported that their organizations were not regis-
tered to receive direct flood alerts.
The flood risk threatened the 391-bed Pilgrim
District General Hospital and led to precautionary
action being taken at a cost of over £5,000: ‘ . . . the
infrastructure of the hospital is under ground level so
we’d actually lose electric, gas, oxygen, everything, if
we got a couple of inches of water’ (strategic decision
maker 044). Where local frontline preparedness was
discussed, activity included sandbagging and the
moving of medical records upstairs: ‘ . . . it was
2 o’clock in the morning . . . I actually was in work at
that time . . .we were able to prepare and try and sandbag
off . . .we did actually move some of the medical records’
(local service manager 030).
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Figure 1. Flood extent of December 2013 east coast surge and location of health care sites.
GP: general practitioner.
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At-risk populations
Determining vulnerability to the health impacts of
flooding is complex. Difficulties in defining the term
‘vulnerability’ and different institutional practices for
formatting data hindered information sharing and the
compilation of a comprehensive list of vulnerable indi-
viduals. ‘Hidden’ populations (such as (unregistered)
migrant workers) and those with English as a second
language challenged effective communication of
flood risks.
Institutional challenges in identifying at-risk individ-
uals emerged: ‘ . . . someone who is registered blind
with significantly reduced mobility but actually lives in
supported housing . . . and her daughter does her shop-
ping . . . she is a significant vulnerable person but she’s
not sitting on anybody’s list’ (strategic decision maker
043). Furthermore, vulnerability is not a static charac-
teristic: ‘[people] . . . suddenly find themselves vulnerable,
a mother who’s just been released out of hospital after
having a baby’ (strategic decision maker 008).
Challenges defining flood vulnerability led to mis-
communication between frontline responders and the
Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) responsible for
coordinating the joint response to the flooding: ‘the
NHS . . . asked us for a list of vulnerable patients . . . so
we were asking, what do you mean and they didn’t have a
set criteria . . . another practice would have done what
they thought’ (local service manager 030).
Postflooding, several general practices developed a set
of vulnerability criteria to aid future flood manage-
ment. Different data formats hindered the compilation
of a comprehensive list of vulnerable people; some vul-
nerable individuals were identified after the flooding
through door-to-door knocking and referred to the vol-
untary sector: ‘ . . . the lists of lists didn’t work . . .So we
produced a questionnaire on an A4 sheet of paper . . . to
go and door knock and . . . find out what the vulnerabil-
ities are’ (strategic decision maker 008).
A significant population of migrant workers pre-
sented a challenge to effective communication of the
flood risks: ‘ . . . there was a significant percentage or
proportion of people that . . . didn’t have English as their
first language’ (strategic decision maker 003). One stra-
tegic decision maker reflected: ‘ . . . there are 70 different
languages spoken . . . and so we contacted [local transla-
tion company] and they . . .went round with the Police
doing the door knocking . . .we’d send them [our public
communications] . . . and we’d have that back in five or
six different languages’. The effectiveness of public
flood alerts was also raised: ‘ . . . after [the flood] . . .
people [public] then say “I received a flood warning,
I didn’t know what to do with it”’ (strategic decision
maker 008).
Evacuation
Evacuation of the Boston area was complex due to
densely occupied housing, refusal to evacuate and
cases of complex health care being delivered at home.
In addition, routine health care was disrupted by evac-
uation. Commenting on the refusal to evacuate, one
participant reflected:
People would literally refuse to move and potentially put
themselves in danger unless their pet could go with
them . . . refused to answer the door to the police so you
have to get a district nurse or a health worker to go with
the police and try to persuade the patient. (local service
manager 005)
Logistical challenges were introduced by a very high
number of evacuees having a body mass index of
40þ. Patients receiving complex health care at home
were encountered during the evacuation process:
If patients were complex or especially bariatric, that
some logistics were going to be needed to move them,
we would advise the police . . . some patients made the
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Figure 2. Breakdown of interviews by interview and organization type.
NHS: National Health Service.
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decision that they wouldn’t move, . . . so for them it’s
a case of keeping them safe where they are . . . .it’s
about how you get that support into them and
that they’re understanding the implications of the
choices that they’ve made . . ..an individual that is very
vulnerable and just refuses to move can take an
enormous amount of effort to sort out. (local service
manager 005)
Challenges regarding mental capacity (a person’s abil-
ity to make their own decisions) and the right for pal-
liative patients to refuse evacuation were also raised:
‘There was one gentleman who had a palliative diag-
nosis . . . he was living in the upstairs of his house because
the lower floor was flooded . . . but the gentleman had
[mental] capacity, he didn’t want to move out of his
house . . . ’ (local service manager 006).
Evacuees arrived at rest centres without their pre-
scription medication and reported stress-related condi-
tions. Sourcing medication proved difficult despite the
presence of prescribing nurses at the evacua-
tion centres:
Mostly it [work in the rest centres] was related to people
who’d been evacuated, who hadn’t got medication, people
who, due to the stress of being evacuated also then devel-
oped chest pain or breathing difficulties . . . trying to iden-
tify pharmacists was quite difficult. (local service
manager 006)
Evacuation and temporary relocation was found to
compromise patient tracking. However, deducing an
evacuee’s regular medication was aided by summary
care records (an electronic patient record providing a
summary of NHS patient data held on a central
database covering England) ‘ . . . in terms of finding
out what medication someone is on, summary care
records are available and they are important technolo-
gies to exploit’ (local service manager 005). Record
management issues also caused difficulties in tracking
vulnerable children: ‘ . . . the evacuation centres’ use of
paper records . . . caused us problems in terms of being
able to access our records and look at where those
vulnerable children might have gone, making sure we
could keep track of those children (local service man-
ager 005).
Health care infrastructure and services
All participants reported health care sector disruption;
one health care site was reportedly flooded with two
feet of water. At a time of seasonal pressure on services
(the increase in demand for health and social care serv-
ices seen in winter), mutual aid was required across
health care providers, and services were relocated to
other sites around Boston because of flooding or
power loss.
Nursing staff and assets were relocated to support
other services and the emergency response (for exam-
ple, evacuation centres). Staff from the voluntary
sector provided support. Disruptions caused by staff
shortages were widely reported, alongside difficulty
accessing sites for both patients and staff: ‘The Police
were stopping people travelling down certain roads . . . it
took a while before the Police on the ground were allow-
ing NHS staff through . . . so there were people working a
couple of hours’ longer waiting for their relief to come in’
(strategic decision maker 044).
Staff-owned four-wheel drive vehicles were used to
transport doctors to home visits and to assist health
care staff in getting to work. The Lincolnshire 4 4
Response charity provided support to the health care
sector: ‘ . . . the 4 by 4 people were out in their big 4 by 4
Range Rovers getting places, getting staff moved ’ (stra-
tegic decision maker 044). Staff being personally affect-
ed by flooding further reduced workforce levels: ‘I had
both staff that couldn’t get into work because of their
own personal concerns at home’ (strategic decision
maker 042).
Routine health care was disrupted across multiple
services. In light of the flooding, dialysis treatment
was delayed and appointments rescheduled for the
next day; disruptions were also reported for dentistry
and sexual health services. Family doctor appointments
were rescheduled, home visits were extended into the
evening, and telephone consultations were offered as an
alternative to face-to-face consultations. Mental health
services followed instructions to evacuate one unit in
Boston, leading to the withdrawal of face-to-face serv-
ices for one day.
Pilgrim District General Hospital prepared for ver-
tical evacuation (moving patients to a higher floor
away from the area of danger) with clinicians under-
taking evacuation triage of inpatients. Elective surgery
and outpatient clinics were cancelled for 6th December
2013, and discharges were halted the evening of
the surge:
We can’t discharge 90 year olds to homes that were
about to be flooded, . . .we halted all discharges
. . .Luckily for us, we had spare beds that night . . .we
run generally around 97-99%, we’re always pretty full-
. . . it increases the pressure on transport to get people
out. (strategic decision maker 004)
Ambulance diversions to alternative hospitals were also
activated: ‘ . . . if somebody was inbound on an ambulance
and . . . they were on the cusp of going to one hospital or
another . . .we said it’s still open but it could be flooded so
you might as well send them to another hospital’
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(strategic decision maker 044). Furthermore,
‘ . . . ambulances couldn’t get through the water . . .we
had to pull a couple of them out [ambulances assigned
to the rescue operation] to go and deal with a chest pain
that was in an area where the ambulances couldn’t get to’
(strategic decision maker 010).
Admission criteria were relaxed for evacuees receiv-
ing complex health care at home in order to place them
in community hospitals overnight. With limited places
and the need to maintain services, the movement of
patients and mutual aid required between organiza-
tions placed a strain on services felt across the health
care sector:
If the nursing homes were going to be evacuated, where
were we going to put those people because at that time, it
was a time of winter pressures as well . . . how would we
maintain the acute trust services because if we put some
of those into our community hospitals, then the commu-
nity hospitals wouldn’t be able to discharge, so it raised a
lot of questions in terms of the whole system working.
(local service manager 006)
Disruption to the day-to-day work of the health care
system led to the prioritization of patients and the can-
cellation of services outside the flooded area:
People that were expecting the district nurses and were
not going to get it . . . and what’s the implication of that
and is that critical, that visit, or not critical . . . and that
could be for patients that are nowhere near the flooding
at all . . . . (local service manager 005)
The impact on health care service demand was
described as a surge:
It might be water contamination or illness . . . you do tend
to get a bit of a surge of patients turning up . . . general
practice often feel the brunt of that, of course, A&E
department to an extent as well but particularly general
practice. (local service manager 005)
Furthermore, an increased demand for psychological
services was reported in the area postflooding:
‘ . . . there was an increase in the number of people
seeing their GP, with anxiety and depression . . . there
was some evidence of a slight increase in psychological
demand’ (strategic decision maker 002).
Opportunities for resilience
All participants reported that their organizations had
reviewed policy and practice following the flooding: ‘It
focused the mind and it did make us make changes and
make a difference’ (local service manager). An increase
in frontline preparedness and subscription to flood
alert services was reported postflooding:
Now, if we get a flood warning saying this is going to
happen, move stuff off the floor and have the sandbags
prepared . . . .so I think if we get a serious warning in the
future, it will be taken a lot more seriously. (local service
manager 030)
Following the event, predefined search criteria for
vulnerable patients have been agreed between some
GP practices and a new vulnerable persons protocol
has been created by the LRF: ‘we have now said to
organisations “you hold your own list, we will contact
you and tell you what the risk is and what you need to
do and then you contact your own people”’ (strategic
decision maker 043). During future floods, this
approach will be supported by a temporary telephone
helpline number for those who find themselves vulner-
able: ‘So we’re capturing those that suddenly find them-
selves vulnerable . . . to then contact the relevant
organisations within health to provide that support’ (stra-
tegic decision maker 008).
The evacuation plan for Pilgrim District General
Hospital was revised:
Pilgrim Hospital have had a robust review of their hos-
pital evacuation plan . . . some of the learning and the
benefits . . . is that the [evacuation] plan, whereas previ-
ously has been written very much in silo by the hospital,
has now absolutely had consultation with wider partners.
(strategic decision maker 043)
An action card for the medical director has been
created: ‘We’ve got an action card now for our medical
director, so the medical lead has now been incorporated
into our major incident plan’ (strategic decision
maker 044). Business continuity arrangements have
also been reviewed with one participant reflecting:
‘ . . . our evacuation plans had been [to relocate] to
health centres close by and in fact, those health centres
would have also been flooded . . . it did make us look at a
wider range of business continuity’ (local service manag-
er 005).
Barriers to property-level protection included cost,
confusion over the level of flood risk and tenancy
agreements: ‘We’ve looked at flood gates . . . I think
they said it was going to cost about £20k, so we’ll take
the risk’ (local service manager 030). Difficulties
obtaining sandbags were reported, and accounts of
sandbags being stolen were shared by participants.
One GP practice now stores sand and empty sandbags
on-site for future events.
Participants reflecting on the event identified some
positive themes. Despite a reported low uptake (50%)
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of household insurance,22 engagement with the
Association of British Insurers within the recovery
phase was considered successful, as: ‘ . . . very distressed
and emotional members of the public, were able to have a
single point . . . that could address all their con-
cerns . . . and that worked extremely well’ (strategic deci-
sion maker 003). Within the SCG, the amalgamation of
the originally separate health and social care cells pro-
vided a more holistic health sector perspective.
Participants reflected that the impact upon the health
care sector would have been significantly worse, had it
not been for the staff themselves: ‘The NHS does stand
up and goes beyond the call of duty . . . that’s good in a
way, but bad for long-term planning . . . you can’t rely on
that goodwill forever’ (strategic decision maker 044).
Discussion
The responses from participants demonstrate the chal-
lenges associated with delivering frontline health care
services at times of heightened flood risk. Following an
event, it is often only the immediate, traumatic health
impacts associated with flooding that are recorded.
This study contributes to the limited evidence sur-
rounding health care system disruption by revealing
the wider system impacts and capacity issues.
Appropriate methodologies for measurement, surveil-
lance and evaluation are required to produce further
insights that can be applied to flood risk management
and other environmental hazards.
The magnitude of the December 2013 surge is com-
parable to the 1953 event; however, advances in flood
defences and forecasting served to minimize impacts.
Nonetheless, breaching and overtopping of flood
defences led to disruption of the health service. It is
clear that despite the impacts being significantly lower
than the reasonable worst-case scenario (Table 1), the
2013 event tested the resilience and capacity of the
health care sector, indicating inadequate preparedness
to respond to a future North Sea event whilst minimiz-
ing disruption to day-to-day services.
Based upon the findings of this research, the lack of
preparedness is due to insufficient appreciation of flood
risks and poor understanding of the impact of flood
damage and disruption, particularly at the frontline
of health care services. Extreme weather events often
present an opportunity to reflect upon readiness and
increase resilience through experience and learning.
Implementation of the lessons learnt through Exercise
Lazarus, carried out one month before the December
event, appears to have been limited due to the short
time between the exercise and flood event. The tenden-
cy to work in silos hindered the development of work-
ing partnerships and business continuity planning,
undermining cross-system resilience. Furthermore,
governance, oversight and the development of coherent
strategies were challenged by fragmentation of health
services. Greater multiagency linking of planning
assumptions to preparedness and resilience measures
is required to ensure long-term behavioural change is
established and ensure the goodwill described by NHS
staff is not relied upon in future. Ongoing research is
required to monitor the preparedness and resilience of
health care systems.
Ascertaining vulnerability to the health consequen-
ces of flooding is a complex26 process and is determined
by factors beyond event magnitude (for example, social
circumstances). This study has highlighted the difficul-
ties associated with classifying vulnerability in the con-
text of flooding risk and the challenges of
communicating the risk to marginalized groups.27
With a growing, ageing population and a projected
increase in complex health care being delivered at
home, the identification of hidden, vulnerable popula-
tions is an urgent priority.
The creation of flood vulnerability criteria may aid
future flood management, but the result is likely to
identify hundreds if not thousands of individuals.
Further work is required to develop a more sensitive
search that considers unmet health and social care
needs. With responsibility for contacting vulnerable
individuals in Lincolnshire moving to individual
health care services, individuals are likely to be con-
tacted several times; this has been known to cause frus-
tration in previous flood incidents.
Vulnerability to flooding is increasing due to popu-
lation growth, land use, demographic change and
increasing levels of poor health which impact on the
ability of individuals, communities and services to
respond to an emergency. Emerging vulnerable popu-
lations have also been identified. With an increasing
prevalence of obesity in the UK, the evacuation chal-
lenges presented here should be considered for future
flood planning and practice. Furthermore, bed capacity
across the whole health care system was tested, partic-
ularly in community hospital settings, when people
with complex health care were evacuated from their
home and placed in a health care bed. Cases of refusal
to evacuate take considerable time and resourcing to
address during the emergency response phase. In these
cases, this study highlights the need for clinical advice
in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act (2005) that
ensures individuals have an understanding of the
potential implications whilst balancing the rights of
the patient and risk to frontline responders.
This study supports the findings of other studies on
medication disruption during evacuation28 but has also
identified difficulties tracking preexisting patients and
sourcing medication. The provision of psychological
and pharmaceutical support at evacuation centres
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requires clarification. Mutual aid arrangements
between health care providers need to reconsider the
potential geographical scale of an event. In the event of
another 1953-type surge, several LRFs are likely to be
affected, therefore increasing the demand on external
assistance and equipment.
This work illustrates the important role of the vol-
untary sector in supporting the health care sector
during times of high-impact weather. Voluntary
sector organizations should therefore be included in
pre-event incident planning and exercising. The devel-
opment of a questionnaire for door-to-door knocking
is an example of a health needs assessment that could
inform public health interventions during an emergen-
cy response and aid understanding of flood-related
health impacts and effective interventions. Difficulties
with insurance and insurance claims are a recognized
secondary stressor that influences the psychological
morbidity associated with flooding.29,30 The early
engagement of the insurance sector in flood response
should therefore be encouraged.
This research provides insight and learning on the
impacts and disruption associated with flooding that
may be applicable to other high-impact weather
events (for example, heatwaves) and to other regions
along the east coast of England and those international
health systems around the North Sea Basin that share
common functions and goals. The results of this
research are unlikely to be unique to Lincolnshire,
and further work is required to ascertain the scalability
and its applicability to other regions.
Limitations
Several limitations for this study must be recognized.
Interviews were conducted more than two years after
the event, thereby introducing recall, recruitment and
interviewer bias. The relatively low response rate from
frontline health care providers introduces a sampling
bias that potentially inhibits the scalability of the study.
Conclusion
This study has demonstrated the difficulties experi-
enced by health care services in Boston in responding
to the 2013 coastal flood. Flooding and coastal change
risk are considered one of the top six interrelated cli-
mate change risks for the UK, and analysis suggests
that 0.5 to 1 m of sea level rise could make some 200
km of coastal flood defences in England highly vulner-
able to failure in storm conditions,2,6 indicating the
scale of greater preparedness required to protect
health in light of a changing climate. Health care ser-
vice commissioners and regional strategic decision
makers should assure themselves that local service
managers are registered to directly receive high-
impact weather alerts and have completed the learning
resources on high-impact weather available. Despite
increasing fragmentation of health services in
England, greater vertical and horizontal communica-
tion is required across stakeholders including non-
health partners.
The considerable scale of health care disruption in
December 2013 occurred despite only a small number
of health care assets being directly flooded and the
timing of the surge outside normal working hours.
Improved recording of flood impacts and disruption
is required,14 and the emergency planning community
should ensure that multiagency exercises contain a real-
istic portrayal of capacity within the health sector. The
creation of a new exercise that accurately reflects the
health care disruption documented in this study should
be considered.
The December 2013 east coast surge was the first
significant flood event since the introduction of new
roles and responsibilities associated with the Health
and Social Care Act (2012). Nonetheless, measures
and efforts to increase preparedness in the health care
system need to be proportionate to the exposure of the
system to weather-related hazards. More work is
required to increase the climate resilience of the
health care sector, particularly when climate change is
set to increase the risk of weather-related impacts.
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